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Book Review

A. R. Buck, The Making of Australian Property Law. Sydney, N.S.W.:
Federation Press, 2006. 176 pp.
Students in first year law in English-speaking common law schools
in Canada follow a fairly standard curficulum, heavily weighted in favour
of private law subjects such as torts, contracts and property, with criminal
law, constitutional law, and perhaps a methods, theories or skills course
rounding out their required courses. Most students find the content to be
as they expected in courses in torts, contracts, criminal and constitutional
law. These areas of law, after all, provide the law-related stories that are an
increasing part of national and even international news. But many students
find first year property a puzzle. They expect the course to deal with
protecting one's property from others; buying and selling land; creating
and marketing residential, commercial and recreational developments; or
raising money on the security of land. Instead, students are presented with
ideas of property rights and obligations that developed in England in the
five hundred years following the Norman Conquest. Grappling with such
abstractions as freehold and leasehold estates, reversions and remainders,
or determinable and defeasible interests, students have little time to ponder
why rules that developed in a very different time and place continue to
shape the possibilities for structuring their client's business and family
opportunities in the twenty-first century.
In Australia, it seems, based on my quick survey of law programmes
online, most students beginning a university law programme will study
torts and contracts but not property law. In upper years, they will take
courses that treat land law separately from other aspects of property law,
using texts that assume that land law in Australia is "peculiarly Australian."
Andrew Buck includes this quotation, taken from the first page of A.
Bradbrook, S. MacCallum, and A. Moore, Australian Real PropertyLaw,
in the preface to his monograph, The Making ofAustralianPropertyLaw.
(p. vii) He refers to other authors as well who have paid careful attention
to "distinctively Australian adaptations of the inherited English law of
real property." (p. viii) The emphasis on change rather than continuity
may stimulate student questions about how the law they study came to
be. Buck's book provides some answers. By placing legal developments
in their social and economic context, Buck shows that law develops not
according to its own internal logic, but is the product of human choices,
often made to further a particular vision of how best to structure social and
economic relations.
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Buck has no quarrel with the description of Australian property law as
distinctive. He opens his book with the assertion that "the feudal imprint
on property in Australia had been 'washed away' by the early 1860s and
that the decades of the early 19th century witnessed the making of a
distinct Australian property law." (p. viii, quotation marks in the original,
no reference given) Buck's concern is not the details of the distinctiveness,
but the characterization of the relationship between property and law
which emerged in early Australia. Reacting against the sometimes
unstated assumption that changes in land law were a necessary shedding
of feudal vestiges in an emerging capitalist economy, Buck argues that
one can best understand property law in Australia "by reference, not to the
dominant mode of production, but to the relationship between property
law and society." (p. 139) Based on the debates in the legislature and
the popular press concerning various proposals for reform of the law
governing property rights in New Soutli Wales, Buck's account of the
making of Australian property law diverges from earlier accounts in two
main ways. First, Buck argues that property law in Australia developed its
distinctive character earlier than generally believed, and second, that this
development was the product of a distinctive logic of property that Buck
calls possessive egalitarianism. Thus, Buck asserts, "in mid-19th century
New South Wales the 'ghost' of feudalism was giving way to the 'spectre'
of egalitarianism." (p. 139)
Buck's reference to the 'spectre' of egalitarianism is, I assume,
an oblique reference to the first sentence of the Communist Manifesto,
written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and first published in 1848. It
begins: "A spectre is haunting Europe-the spectre of communism." The
'ghost' of feudalism invokes the language used by A. D. Hargreaves and:
B. A. Helmore, in An Introduction to the Principles of Land Law (New
South Wales) (Sydney, NSW, 1963) in discussing Attorney-General v.
Brown (1847), a case which Buck says had "profound implications for the
development of Australian property law." (p. vii) Chief Justice Brennan
cited AG v. Brown in the High Court decision in Mabo v. Queenland
(No. 2) (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1, as authority for the proposition that the
English doctrine of feudal tenures was the foundation of real property law
in Australia. In Mabo, the High Court departed from two hundred years
of precedent and policy in declaring that native title could, and in some
cases, did, survive the British assertion of sovereignty over the Australian
continent. Although the Crown acquired radical title to the Australian
continent by its assertion of sovereignty at international law, it acquired
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that title subject to the pre-existing rights of the Aborigines and Torres
Strait Islanders.
. The aftermath of Mabo included the Native Title Act, which attempted
to fit property rights derived from pre-colonial occupation of land into the
property law regime of modem Australia. This legislation was significantly
amended after the decision in Wik Peoples v. Queensland (1996), 187
C.L.R. 1, suggested that native title was not necessarily extinguished by
the grant of pastoral leases. Buck quotes Justice Gummow's observation
in the Wik decision that "lawyers have been bemused by the apparent
continuity of their heritage into a way of thinking which inhibits historical
understanding." Nonetheless, in Mabo, the High Court corrected an error
of history while maintaining what Chief Justice Brennan referred .to as
"the skeleton of principle which gives the body of our law its shape and
internal consistency." Buck quotes Chief Justice Brennan's statement in
Mabo that it was "far too late in the day" to destroy that skeleton. Yet
Chief Justice Brennan managed to make the skeleton support native title
by drawing on doctrines developed in the English Court of Chancery-just
as legal title could be burdened with rights recognized in the Court of
Chancery, so the Crown's radical title could be burdened with native title.
Law is the product, but not the prisoner of history.
The Mabo decision, while it could not undo the injustice of the many
acts of colonial dispossession of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, at
least exposed the human agency behind the dispossession. It was not the
feudal property law that the colonists brought with them that dispossessed
the original Australians of their land, but the colonists' inability to perceive
these inhabitants as rights holders, with claims more valid than their own.
Buck's second chapter, called "The Empire ofProperty," deals directly with
the dispossession ofAustralia's original inhabitants. In it, Buck "examines
the process by which market-oriented notions of property as a tradeable
commodity were displacing alternative notions that' supported customary
and communal property rights." (p. 14) This process was underway in
England, with enclosures of the commons and denial of customary rights
such as the right to glean in another's field after harvest, at the same time
as English law was introduced into the colonies. Why then, Buck asks,
did settlers with experience of customary property rights in England reject
the communal property claims of indigenous peoples?
To answer this question, Buck draws on the work of M. J. Radin,
who distinguished between constitutive property that has value to the
individual because it expresses that individual's personhood, and fungible
property that has value as a commodity. In this chapter and others,
Buck argues that Australia's white settlers overwhelmingly thought of
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property as a means to acquire wealth, perhaps as a means to return again
to England, or perhaps as a means to acquire power in Australia. In any
case, Australia's settlers had little sympathy for aboriginal ideas of land
and identity as inseparable. Buck quotes E. P. Thompson's description of
the enclosure movement in England as making the poor "strangers in their
own land" and suggests the denial of aboriginal peoples' relationship with
the land had the same consequence. Buck does not develop this idea, but
the white settlers, too, were strangers where they immigrated and strangers
again if they tried to return to England. In English, after all, the word
"title" is both recognition of one's position, as in, for example, the title of
Earl, and evidence of one's right to the family's landed property. It is not
surprising that settlers who left England to escape that linking of property
and personhood were not eager to see it re-established in the colony, or
to accord any validity to pre-existing notions of property relations that
rendered property inalienable and inaccessible to the newcomers.
As Buck argues, in a society in which the majority view property as a
means to gain wealth, land ownership is likely to be regarded differently
than in a society in which one's landholding is the basis and buttress of one's
social position. Leasehold tenures in England were expected to support a
landed 61ite. Attempts to recreate a leasehold system in the North American
colony of Prince Edward Island faced sustained, sometimes violent, and
ultimately successful resistance. In New South Wales, in contrast, those
who hoped to make a fortune raising cattle or sheep supported Crown
leaseholds that provided relatively cheap access to grazing land. The
prevalenceof leasehold tenure in New South Wales contributed to blurring
the distinction between real and personal property, as Buck demonstrates
in his description of the colonial debate on such questions as abolition of
primogeniture in cases of intestacy, administration of intestates' estates,
recognition of new security interests such as liens on-wool, appropriate
limitation periods for bringing actions to recover possession of land, and
introduction of the Torrens system of public registration of titles to land.
The introduction of the Torrens system was intended "to make land as
easily transferable as stock"-a quotation from English political economist
John Stuart Mill that was often invoked by Robert Richard Torrens,
promoter of the Torrens system. (p. 125) Buck argues that reforms to
limit the widow's right to her dower-a life interest in her deceased
husband's real property-had the same purpose. The defenders of dower
characterized it as an ancient right that provided some compensation for
the legal incapacity a woman suffered on marriage. The reformers saw it
as "a burdensome interference on the profitable exploitation of land as a
commodity on the market." (p. 100) And the reformers prevailed. Dower
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ensured that heirs used the family land to fulfil their family obligations,
but it was inconsistent with the fluidity of family and market relationships
in New South Wales. Registration and the concomitant state guarantee of
title were possible only if land were freed of non-commercial burdens,
and treated as a commodity. As Buck shows, proponents of sbmething
as seemingly arcane as conveyancing reform characterized their cause as
"a people's question" because everyone in Australia expected to become
a proprietor. (p. 104) Making land ownership available to even those of
modest means would "tum the 'poor man' into a propertied man," (p.
109) and ensure that democracy in Australia would be a bulwark against
socialism.
Possessive egalitarianism is the name Buck that gives to the particular
property system, or the particular relationship between property, law
and society, that emerged from and provided support for Australia's
adaptations and innovations with respect to real property law. The
adjective distinguishes Buck's use of the -term egalitarianism from other
scholars' use of the same term in explicating Australian history and popular
culture. As used by scholars such as Elaine Thompson, John Hirst, and
Stuart Macintryre, the term encompasses Australians' widespread belief
in equality in social relations and social standing, despite real inequalities.
Buck quotes Thompson's encapsulation of the concept in the expression
that "Jack is as good as his master." (p. 137) Buck uses the term to describe
not ideas about equality but ideas about access to land: land should be
available cheaply and easily, through a universal market system, free of
the legal complications necessary to permit the landed dlite to perpetuate
their power and status through land ownership, and free as well of any
claims based on the spiritual and cultural relationship between indigenous
peoples and the land they occupied.
In his title and in summarizing his conclusions, Buck speaks of
Australian law, but his examples are drawn from a single colony, New
South Wales. I live in Atlantic Canada, and so am perhaps unduly sensitive
to claims that the part stands for the whole, having tired of frequent
reminders that power brokers elsewhere regard Canada east of Quebec
as peripheral. Perhaps the regional dynamic is different in Australia. I
expect, though, that if I lived in Queensland or South Australia, I would
grumble that a more accurate, though perhaps'less compelling, title for
Buck's book would be The Making ofLand Law in New South Wales. And
I would wonder whether Attorney-Generalv. Brown was all that important.
Australians, colonists elsewhere, and even in 1925 the English themselves,
re-made the law in accordance with the wishes of those who were able to
convince legislators and judges of the congruence between what suited
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them, what society needed, and what the law required--in short, those who
achieved hegemony in public and legal discourse. In Australia, that was
neither aristocrats nor aboriginal peoples.
Dr. Margaret McCallum
Professor, Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick

